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Abstract
We propose a new structural model that can compute the electricity
spot and forward prices in two coupled markets with limited intercon-
nection and multiple fuels. We choose a structural approach in order to
represent some key characteristics of electricity spot prices such as their
link to fuel prices, consumption level and production fleet. With this
model, explicit formulas are also available for forward prices and other
derivatives. We give some illustrative results of the behaviour of spot and
forward prices, and of the values of transmission rights.
key words: energy markets, structural models, derivatives pricing, elec-
tricity forwards, interconnection
1 Introduction
European electricity markets are mainly organized country by country. But
these national markets are also interconnected with their neighbors. The two
main advantages of interconnected markets are the following.
• Decreasing physical risk. The interconnection between countries allows
the pooling and sharing of available production capacities. And, because
the electricity consumptions and production outages in these countries are
not perfectly correlated, the interconnection makes the system more robust
when facing extreme events. According to the French TSO1 , this is the
first mission of interconnection: "These interconnections are therefore first
used to ensure the operating safety of the power transmission networks."
• Optimizing financial cost. The interconnection, by sharing production
units in different markets, allows the (multi-country) system to be more
efficient and to decrease the global (marginal) cost of electricity produc-
tion.
1Introduction to interconnections, http://clients.rte-france.com/lang/an/clients_traders
_fournisseurs/services_clients/dispositif_global.jsp
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The current trend in European electricity markets is integration. In Novem-
ber 2010, the Central West Europe (CWE) zone launched market coupling in
the spot markets. This zone consists of five countries: France, Germany, Nether-
lands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. In 2014 and early 2015, the Euro area ex-
tended market coupling to a much larger zone which represents 19 European
countries and around 85% of the European demand2.
Under market coupling, players bid on spot markets through implicit auc-
tions and do not have to take into account cross-border capacities. This is the
market exchange which notifies players and use cross-border capacities in order
to minimize the price difference within the zone. Therefore, market coupling
enables to optimize cross-border interconnection usage.
As a consequence of market coupling, in 2015, the CWE region’s spot price
was unique 19% of time which means that no congestion occurred at intercon-
nections. In this case, the spot price was determined as if the five countries were
only one. In 2014, market prices were the same in France and Germany around
50% of the time, 27 % in 2015. In May 2015, the methodology to calculate
cross-border capacities in the CWE switched from price coupling to flow-based
coupling in order to better take into account the network’s physical constraints.
Therefore, modelling interconnected markets is more and more necessary to
capture the (new) stylized facts of spot prices. This modelling is essential to ef-
ficiently participate in explicit long-term auctions of interconnection capacities
organized by Joint Allocation Office JAO3. These auctions occur for many Eu-
ropean interconnections for yearly and monthly delivery. Another application
of the model is to take advantage of a neighbouring market with higher liquidity
to better hedge the risk of a particular market in which the liquidity is limited
(proxy-hedging). Indeed, liquidity is very different on European markets. For
example, traded volumes on both organized and OTC markets are around five
times higher in Germany compared to other European markets (source [Com-
mission, 2015]). Market liquidity is measured in this report as the churn rate
(i.e. the ratio between the global traded volume and electricity consumption).
This rate is at least four times higher in Germany compared to others. The re-
cent diminution of trading volumes in Belgium and Denmark is partly explained
by players who use the more liquid German market for hedging instead of their
domestic market [Carr, 2012]. Thus, for these applications, the targeted models
must be able to represent forward contracts as well as spot prices.
In the last few years, electricity markets have evolved very rapidly in terms
of renewable production. According to the European Commission, the share of
renewable production has grown from 14 % in 2004 to 27.5 % in 2014. As an
example, wind and solar represented 16% of German production in 2014 and
their capacity has multiplied by 3.4 since 2004. This increase deeply changes the
characteristics of electricity prices: average level, volatility, peaks, and season-
2Market Coupling, A Major Step Towards Market Integration,
http://www.epexspot.com/en/market-coupling
3http://www.jao.eu/main
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ality. Especially, positive spikes on the electricity spot market have decreased
in frequency and negative spikes are now quite common on spot and intraday
markets. But transformations of the electricity production mix will continue in
the near future: several thermal plants will be decommissioned and utilities are
planning additional renewable capacities. Thus, electricity price models based
on a purely statistical approach are difficult to calibrate and are not efficient
in reflecting the future characteristics of electricity prices. This is why struc-
tural approaches, directly inspired by [Barlow, 2002], are natural candidates
to model electricity prices. These models are well-known for representing the
stylized facts of spot prices and their (structural) link with fundamental factors
like electricity demand, production capacities, and fuel prices. The most recent
models [Aïd et al., 2012,Carmona and Coulon, 2012] provide analytical formu-
las for forward prices which make them adaptable to risk management purposes
in the case of a unique market. For example, [Coulon et al., 2013] use a spike
regime that they apply to the Texas market; [Carmona et al., 2013] propose
possible changes in the merit order.
But to our knowledge, only a few works aim at representing coupled markets.
In particular, [Kiesel and Kustermann, 2015] and [Fuss et al., 2014], propose a
simple model to represent two interconnected markets where they model the
offer curve as an exponentially increasing function of the electricity demand.
But they only consider one fuel to produce electricity. The authors produce an
analytical formula to retrieve the forward prices. [Mahringer et al., ] apply the
model proposed in [Fuss et al., 2014] to the valuation of transmission rights.
In this paper, we propose a new structural model to represent the spot
prices in two interconnected markets which account for an offer curve related to
several production technologies. Under the classical assumption of no arbitrage,
the forward price at maturity T is equal to the expectation, under some risk-
neutral probability, of the spot price at the future date T . We show that these
forward prices can be computed by an quasi-analytical formula as well as call
options and transmission rights which make the model well-adapted to risk
management purposes.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the
model and the construction of the electricity spot prices. In section 3 we give
the analytical formulas for the valuation of derivatives. In section 4, we show
some illustrative results based on an example. And section 5 concludes.
2 Model description
We propose a multi-commodity electricity price model for two interconnected
zones. In this model, the technologies used to produce electricity can be specific
to each zone. In this way, the model is able to represent the mix of different
technologies for the two interconnected countries and the cross effects the inter-
connection induces. This model then can represent the peculiarities in the spot
prices of the two markets.
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In the following we assume a filtered probability space (Ω,F , {Ft},P), where
{Ft}t is the filtration generated by all of Wiener processes in the model.
2.1 Spot price construction
The model is directly inspired by [Aïd et al., 2012] in the sense that at any time,
the spot price can be related to the production cost of the marginal technology
that is weighted by a scarcity function. Further, the marginal technology at
time t is the one, among all technologies in operation at time t, which has the
highest production cost and which could provide one additional megawatt hour
(MWh) of consumption. The scarcity function positively weights the marginal
cost with respect to the distance from the total production capacity (i.e., sum
of all the available capacities of production units where above this level the
zone encounters production shortages) against the demand required by the con-
sumers at that time. An exponential function is chosen for the scarcity function.
For each market ∗ = A,B, we use the following notations:
• n∗ is the number of available production technologies in market ∗,
• C∗,kt is the available capacity in MW at time t for the technology k =
1, . . . , n∗,
• C∗t =
(
C∗,kt
)
k=1,...,n∗
is the set of available capacities at time t,
• C¯∗t =
∑n∗
l=1 C
∗,l
t is the total available capacity,
• D∗t is the electricity demand at time t,
• S∗,kt is the production cost in e/MWh at time t of the technology k =
1, . . . , n∗,
• S∗t =
(
S∗,kt
)
k=1,...,n∗
is the set of production costs at time t.
In this section we suppose, for notation simplicity, that the production costs
are sorted at time t for each market, that is S∗,1t ≤ S∗,2t ≤ · · · ≤ S∗,n∗t , ∗ = A,B.
The case of possible switches in the merit order is addressed in section 2.3. We
define the marginality intervals as:
I∗,kt =
[
k−1∑
i=0
C∗,it ;
k∑
i=0
C∗,it
]
, ∗ = A,B
with the additional bound assumption of CA,0t = C
B,0
t = 0.
We define the offer curve P ∗ for each market ∗ = A,B as a piecewise expo-
nential function of the power demand. Given a demand d∗ to satisfy in market
∗, the offer function is given by:
P ∗(S∗t ,C
∗
t , d
∗) =
n∗∑
k=1
f∗(S∗,kt , C¯
∗
t , d
∗)1d∈I∗,kt (1)
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with
f∗(s, c, d) = seα
∗+β∗(c−d) (2)
where the fixed coefficients are α∗ ∈ R and β∗ ≤ 0, ∗ = A,B. The conditions
that these coefficients are not dependent on technology k and that β∗ is negative,
ensure that the offer curve is an increasing (but not necessarily continuous)
function of the demand level. However these coefficients can be different in
each market. In the case where the markets are disconnected, P ∗(S∗t ,C∗t , d∗)
corresponds to the spot price in the market ∗.
Next, the commercial flow Et through the interconnection between zone A
and zone B.4 Because of the coupling mechanism, the commercial flow Et is
determined such as to minimize the absolute distance between the spot prices
of the two countries. Furthermore, Et is bounded by the NTC (Net Transfer
Capacity)
[
¯
E, E¯
]
set by network operators (note that
¯
E ≤ 0 and E¯ ≥ 0). The
NTC is determined by network operators driven by physical constraints: the
physical capacity of the interconnection line and the additional operational net-
work constraints to guarantee the sufficient reliability of the system.
Given the optimal commercial flow Et, the demand to satisfy in zone A is
DAt + Et whereas the demand to satisfy in zone B is DBt − Et. The optimal
commercial flow Et can be defined as follows:
Definition 1. The optimal flow Et is defined as:
• if PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt ) ≤ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt ) then
Et = sup
[
¯
E ; E¯]
e
s.t.
PA(SAt ,C
A
t , D
A
t + e) ≤ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt − e)
• if PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt ) ≥ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt ) then
Et = inf
[
¯
E ; E¯]
e
s.t.
PA(SAt ,C
A
t , D
A
t + e) ≥ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt − e)
The power spot prices depend on the optimal flow Et between the two coun-
tries. As suggested in [Kiesel and Kustermann, 2015], we partition the state
space into three events5 depending on the saturated and coupling situations of
the interconnection :
• saturated interconnection from zone A to B, non-coupling situation:
A1 := {w ∈ Ω : PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt + E¯) ≤ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt − E¯)}
4Et > 0 means zone A exports power to zone B and Et < 0 means zone B exports power
to zone A.
5for simplicity the dependence in time t is implicit in all the events defined in this section
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• saturated interconnection from zone B to A, non-coupling situation:
A2 := {w ∈ Ω : PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt + ¯E) ≥ P
B(SBt ,C
B
t , D
B
t − ¯E)}
• non-saturated interconnection and coupled markets:
A3 := Ω\(A1 ∪ A2)
Under the events A1 and A2, the prices in the two markets remain different
even after using the interconnection at the maximum of its capacity. Under the
event A3 we consider the prices in the two markets to be equal and this common
price has to be determined.
In the proposed model, we consider several production technologies. Therefore
we need to refine the previous partition by introducing the marginality in the
two countries. TheMk,l is defined as the event when at time t, the technology
k is marginal in market A and the technology l is marginal in market B. In the
case where the production costs are sorted this event can be defined as:
Mk,l := {ω ∈ Ω : DAt + Et ∈ IA,kt ; DBt − Et ∈ IB,lt }
In the case of possible switches, as we will see in section 2.3, this event is not
easily defined but this does not create any difficulty in the computation results.
Moreover, we define Ai,k,l = Ai ∩ Mk,l so that the state space can be
partition as follows:
Ω =
⋃
1≤i≤3, 1≤k≤,nA, 1≤l≤nB
Ai,k,l
If Vt =
(
SAt ,C
A
t , D
A
t ,S
B
t ,C
B
t , D
B
t
)
is the whole set of variables at time t,
then the power spot prices P¯ ∗ (Vt), ∗ = A,B, can be determined using this
partition:
P¯A (Vt) =
nA∑
k=1
nB∑
l=1
fA(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + E¯)1A1,k,l+
fA(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + ¯
E)1A2,k,l+
fA,B(Vt)1A3,k,l
(3)
and
P¯B (Vt) =
nA∑
k=1
nB∑
l=1
fB(SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − E¯)1A1,k,l+
fB(SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − ¯E)1A2,k,l+
fA,B(Vt)1A3,k,l
(4)
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with fA and fB defined in equation (2). And fA,B is the common price of
the two markets under the event A3,k,l that has to be determined.
2.2 Optimal Et and corresponding prices
In this section we precisely determine the terms of equations (3) and (4). The
cases A1,k,l and A2,k,l are quite trivial and very similar to the cases described
in [Kiesel and Kustermann, 2015]. The event A3,k,l is more tricky because of
the discontinuity of the offer curves, both the optimal flow Et and the common
price fA,B have to be determined.
2.2.1 Cases A1,k,l and A2,k,l
The events A1,k,l and A2,k,l correspond to the saturated situations where zone
A (B) exports to zone B (A) at the maximum of the interconnection capac-
ity. That is, E¯ (resp.
¯
E), and the technology k is marginal in market A and
technology l is marginal in market B. By these event’s definition, we have:
Vt ∈ A1,k,l ⇔

DAt + E¯ ∈ IA,kt
DBt − E¯ ∈ IB,lt
fA(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + E¯) ≤ fB(SB,lt , C¯Bt , DBt − E¯)
(5)
and
Vt ∈ A2,k,l ⇔

DAt + ¯
E ∈ IA,kt
DBt − ¯E ∈ I
B,l
t
fA(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + ¯
E) ≥ fB(SB,lt , C¯Bt , DBt − ¯E)
(6)
2.2.2 Case A3,k,l
Under A3,k,l, the commercial flow is not saturated, that is,
¯
E < Et < E¯. This
condition means that the prices in zones A and B have converged to price
fA,B(Vt).
Because of the discontinuity of the offer curves, there are several cases to
define the optimal commercial flow Et. Indeed, in the case where Et reaches
a discontinuity point of one of the offer curves, the absolute distance between
PA(SAt ,C
A
t , D
A
t + Et) and PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt − Et) may be not zero.
We decompose A3,k,l into 3 incompatible subsets depending on the discon-
tinuity points of the offer curves:
• AA3,k,l = {ω ∈ A3,k,l : DAt + Et is a point of discontinuity of PA}
• AB3,k,l = {ω ∈ A3,k,l : DBt − Et is a point of discontinuity of PB}
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• AC3,k,l = A3,k,l\(AA3,k,l ∪ AB3,k,l)
These events then depend on the fact that Et reaches a discontinuity point on
one of the offer curves. Figure 1 illustrates the events AA3,k,l and AB3,k,l which
depend on the sign of Et.
AA3,k,l with Et > 0 AA3,k,l with Et < 0
AB3,k,l with Et > 0 AB3,k,l with Et < 0
Figure 1: Schematic representation of events AA3,k,l and AB3,k,l where Et reaches
a point of discontinuity.
The Propositions 1 to 3 determine the events AA3,k,l, AB3,k,l and AC3,k,l, re-
spectively, in terms of the inequalities in Vt.
Proposition 1. Set g(Vt) =
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
t −DAt .
The Vt ∈ AA3,k,l is equivalent to the following inequalities:
P1-1 :
¯
E < g(Vt) < E¯
P1-2 : DBt − g(Vt) ∈ IB,lt
P1-3 : fA
(
SA,k−1t , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt)
)
≤ fB
(
SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt)
)
P1-4 : fA
(
SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt)
)
≥ fB
(
SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt)
)
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Moreover, if Vt ∈ AA3,k,l, then the common price is:
fA,B(Vt) = f
B(SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt))
Proposition 2. Set g(Vt) = DBt −
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
t .
The Vt ∈ AB3,k,l is equivalent to the following inequalities:
P2-1 :
¯
E < g(Vt) < E¯
P2-2 : DAt + g(Vt) ∈ IA,kt
P2-3 : fB
(
SB,l−1t , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt)
)
≤ fA
(
SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt)
)
P2-4 : fB
(
SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt)
)
≥ fA
(
SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt)
)
Moreover, if Vt ∈ AB3,k,l, then the common price is
fA,B(Vt) = f
A(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt))
Proposition 3. Set g(Vt) =
lnSA,kt −lnSB,lt +αA−αB+βA(C¯At −DAt )−βB(C¯Bt −DBt )
βA+βB
.
The Vt ∈ AC3,k,l is equivalent to the following inequalities:
P3-1 :
¯
E < g(Vt) < E¯
P3-2 :
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
t < D
A
t + g(Vt) <
∑k
i=0 C
A,i
t
P3-3 :
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
t < D
B
t − g(Vt) <
∑l
i=0 C
B,i
t
Moreover, if Vt ∈ AC3,k,l, then the common price is:
fA,B(Vt) = f
A(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt)) = f
B(SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt))
The proof of Propositions 1, 2 and 3 are given in appendix A.
2.3 The case of switching
The previous section described the construction of the spot prices for fixed
fuels. Now we consider possible switches in the fuels, that is permutations
pi = (piA, piB) with pi∗ = (pi∗1 , pi∗2 . . . , pi∗n∗) , where ∗ = A,B such that, at time t,
we have S∗,pi
∗
1
t < S
∗,pi∗2
t < · · · < S
∗,pi∗n∗
t . The merit order event is:
Spi =
{
ω ∈ Ω ; S∗,pi∗1t < S∗,pi
∗
2
t < · · · < S
∗,pi∗n∗
t , ∗ = A,B
}
The marginality eventMk,l cannot be directly written in terms of only one
interval. Indeed, Mk,l is the event where technology k is marginal in zone A
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and technology l is marginal in zone B. The event then is a union that depends
on the merit order:
Mk,l =
⋃
pi∈Π
(
Spi ∩
{
ω ∈ Ω : DAt ∈ IA,pi
A
k
t ; D
B
t ∈ IB,pi
B
l
t
})
(7)
with Π as the whole set of possible permutations and:
I
∗,pi∗k
t =
pi∗k−1∑
i=0
C
∗,pi∗i
t ;
pi∗k∑
i=0
C
∗,pi∗i
t
 , ∗ = A,B
With the definition ofMk,l and Ai,k,l = Ai ∩Mk,l, the spot prices in the two
markets are then defined by:
P¯A (Vt) =
∑
pi∈Π
nA∑
k=0
nB∑
l=0
fA(S
A,piAk
t , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + E¯)1A1,k,l(Vt)1Spi (Vt)+
fA(S
A,piAk
t , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + ¯
E)1A2,k,l(Vt)1Spi (Vt)+
fA,B(Vt)1A3,k,l(Vt)1Spi (Vt)
(8)
and
P¯B (Vt) =
∑
pi∈Π
nA∑
k=0
nB∑
l=0
fB(S
B,piBl
t , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − E¯)1A1,k,l(Vt)1Spi (Vt)+
fB(S
B,piBl
t , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − ¯E)1A2,k,l(Vt)1Spi (Vt)+
fA,B(Vt)1A3,k,l(Vt)1Spi (Vt)
(9)
with fA,B(Vt) having the same expression as in the previous section, which
replaces k and l with piAk and pi
B
l , respectively.
2.4 Models for fuel prices and demands in the Risk-Neutral
probability
Our setting is clearly an incomplete market (indeed demand and capacities, if
random, are non-tradable). Consequently, the market has an infinite number
of Equivalent Martingale Measures. In the following we directly consider the
model under a pricing probability Q such that, as in [Kiesel and Kustermann,
2015] or [Aïd et al., 2012], it coincides with the physical measure for the non-
tradable risk factors (demands and production capacities).
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For simplicity, we consider the deterministic production capacities defined
by:
C∗,kt = f
∗,k
t ∀k ∈ {1, ..., n∗}, ∗ = A,B (10)
with
f∗,kt = C∗,kk cos(2pit) + C∗,k2 sin(2pit)
However, nothing prevents us from considering the stochastic capacities with
Wiener processes, only the complexity induced by adding new random variables.
The demand processes are modeled as in [Aïd et al., 2012] with a determin-
istic component and an Ornstein-Ulhenbeck process:
D∗t = f
∗
t + D˜
∗
t , ∗ = A,B (11)
with
f∗t = X ∗1 cos(2pit) +X∗2 sin(2pit), ∗ = A,B
and
dD˜∗t = −a∗D˜∗t dt+ σ∗dW ∗t
If N is the total number of technologies. Then, we consider the possible case
where one technology is available in both zones: N ≤ nA+nB . The production
costs are modelled by a log-normal Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
d logSnt = an(mn(t)− logSnt )dt+ σndWnt , n = 1, . . . , N (12)
All of these processes can be correlated by a (N+2)×(N+2) correlation matrix
Σ on all the Wiener processes W 1, . . . ,WN ,WA,WB .
Given one global permutation pi, the permutations are piA and piB which take
the available fuels in each zone, SA,pi
A
k and SB,pi
B
l , from the set Spii of fuels.
As a consequence, the global set Vt of random variables can be rewritten as:
Vt =

logS1t
logS2t
...
logSNt
DAt
DBt

(13)
and is Gaussian conditionally to Vs for any s < t, that is, Vt|Vs ∼ N (µ(s, t) ; Σ(s, t)),
with µ(t, T ) and Σ(t, T ) detailed in appendix B.
3 Derivatives pricing
This section is dedicated to the computation of classical derivatives like forward
prices, European call options, and geographical spread options to value the
transmission rights from interconnection. In the following we ignore interest
rates for notational simplicity.
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3.1 Forward prices
The forward price is set to be the expectation of the spot price under the pricing
measure Q:
F ∗t (T ) = EQ
[
P¯ ∗ (VT ) |Ft
]
= EQt
[
P¯ ∗ (VT )
]
, ∗ = A,B
Using the partition defined by all permutations pi ∈ Π of the production
costs, the power forward prices are then
FAt (T ) =
∑
pi∈Π
nA∑
k=0
nB∑
l=0
E
Q
t
[
fA(S
A,piAk
T , C¯
A
T , D
A
T + E¯)1A1,k,l(VT )1Spi (VT )
]
+
E
Q
t
[
fA(S
A,piAk
T , C¯
A
T , D
A
T + ¯
E)1A2,k,l(VT )1Spi (VT )
]
+
E
Q
t
[
fA,B(VT )1A3,k,l(VT )1Spi (VT )
]
(14)
and
FBt (T ) =
∑
pi∈Π
nA∑
k=0
nB∑
l=0
E
Q
t
[
fB(S
B,piBl
T , C¯
B
T , D
B
T − E¯)1A1,k,l(VT )1Spi (VT )
]
+
E
Q
t
[
fB(S
B,piBl
T , C¯
B
T , D
B
T − ¯E)1A2,k,l(VT )1Spi (VT )
]
+
E
Q
t
[
fA,B(VT )1A3,k,l(VT )1Spi (VT )
]
(15)
All of the terms in these expressions are of the form Et
[
eλ
TVT+η1a≤MVT≤b
]
.
With the Gaussian assumption on Vt and Lemma 1 of appendix B, these terms
can be calculated by the computation of a probability of linear inequality con-
straints of the form P(a ≤MV˜T ≤ b), under a multivariate Gaussian variable
V˜T . A great deal of literature exists on the accurate numerical computation of
the multivariate Gaussian distribution function. We refer to [Genz and Bretz,
2009] for a recent review and the study of the specific linear inequality con-
straints in chapter 5.
3.2 Transmission rights valuation
In Europe, transmission rights are mainly physical and auctioned at yearly and
monthly delivery. These contracts give the owner the right to transfer electricity
across the interconnection in the specified direction by the contract at any hour
of the year or month. If the owner does not nominate its physical right and
when markets are coupled, the owner receives financial compensation equal to
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the spot spread ("Use It or Sell It" condition). Physical Transmission Rights
(PTR) combined with the "Use It or Sell It" condition are equivalent to a Fi-
nancial Transmission Rights (FTR).
The valuation of transmission rights is equal to geographical spread options
which correspond to the interconnection [Mahringer et al., ], that is, the val-
uation at time t of the option of payoff (P¯B(VT ) − P¯A(VT ))+ + (P¯A(VT ) −
P¯B(VT ))
+ at the maturity date T > t. By using the formulations (8) and (9)
of the spot prices, we have:
(P¯B(VT )− P¯A(VT ))+ =
∑
pi,k,l
[
fB(S
B,piBl
T , C¯
B
T , D
B
T − E¯)−
fA(S
A,piAk
T , C¯
A
T , D
A
T + E¯)
]
1A1,k,l∩Spi (Vt)
(P¯A(VT )− P¯B(VT ))+ =
∑
pi,k,l
[
fA(S
A,piAk
T , C¯
A
T , D
A
T + ¯
E)−
fB(S
B,piBl
T , C¯
B
T , D
B
T − ¯E)
]
1A2,k,l∩Spi (Vt)
Therefore, the pricing of the geographical spread options only requires some
terms already used to valuate the forward prices.
3.3 European Call options
In this section, we focus on European call options. For example, we consider the
valuation Ct, at time t, of the option for payoff (P¯A(VT )−K)+ at the maturity
date T > t. The events are defined as:
B1,k =
{
ω ∈ Ω : fA(SA,piAkt , C¯At , DAt + E¯) ≥ K
}
B2,k =
{
ω ∈ Ω : fA(SA,piAkt , C¯At , DAt + ¯E) ≥ K
}
B3,k =
{
ω ∈ Ω : fA,B(Vt) ≥ K
}
for k = 1, . . . , n∗. These events are used to add the term 1P¯A(VT )≥K to the
valuation. We have:
Ct =
∑
pi,k,l
E
Q
t
[
fA(S
A,piAk
t , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + E¯)1A1,k,l∩Spi∩B1,k(Vt)
]
−KQ (A1,k,l ∩ Spi ∩ B1,k)
+ EQt
[
fA(S
A,piAk
t , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + ¯
E)1A2,k,l∩Spi∩B2,k(Vt)
]
−KQ (A2,k,l ∩ Spi ∩ B2,k)
+ EQt
[
fA,B(Vt)1A3,k,l∩Spi∩B3,k(Vt)
]−KQ (A3,k,l ∩ Spi ∩ B3,k)
The events Bi,k can be expressed by linear inequality constraints, as well as
Ai,k,l and Spi, on VT . We can then use the same tools previously used in the
computation of of all the terms in the previous equation.
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4 Numerical illustrations
In this section we give an illustration of the results obtained with the proposed
model. In the following we focus on only one future date T . Therefore, we do
not need to specify any seasonality in the demand and the parameters of the
Ornstein-Uhlenbeck processes. The objective of this section is to first present an
analysis on the reconstructed forward prices and the options for one future date
T , and especially to understand the impact of some parameters on the prices.
As we will see, the behavior of the derivative prices is quite comprehensible and
depends on the initial conditions.
4.1 Description of the example
We consider two neighboring markets which both have two different production
technologies. We consider a Market A with a large cheap capacity and few peak
plants (i.e., more expensive production technology). Market B is also composed
of two technologies but its production costs are, on average, in between those of
Market A. The markets’ characteristics are described in table 1. The parameters
Market A Market B
CA,1T 48GW C
B,1
T 33GW
CA,2T 18GW C
B,2
T 56GW
Et[D
A
T ] 50GW Et[D
B
T ] 45GW
Et[logS
A,1
T ] log 10 Et[logS
B,1
T ] log 20
Et[logS
A,2
T ] log 40 Et[logS
B,2
T ] log 35
Table 1: Characteristics of the markets
of function f are set to βA = βB = −0.01, αA = 0.56 and αB = 0.89 and Figure
2 illustrates the average production costs (offer curve) of the two markets.
If we consider deterministic demand levels and fuel costs, we trivially obtain
the following results.
• The global merit order is (SA,1T , SB,1T , SB,2T , SA,2T ).
• Without any interconnection, Market A and Market B need to operate
their two types of production assets in order to satisfy their corresponding
level of demand.
• When the interconnection is higher than 2GW, the technology SA,2T is no
longer operated and replaced by the added demand in Market B, that by
technology SB,2T satisfied.
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• The level of the interconnection has an impact on the marginal cost of
Market A, whereas the one in Market B is always related to the technology
SB,2T , whatever the level of the interconnection.
In the case where we add random levels of demand, we expect the price be-
haviour to change but to remain close to the ones previously described. In the
case where we add random levels of fuel prices, we expect greater impacts. In
particular, the merit order might change. For example, if SB,2T becomes higher
than SA,2T , then we expect a behaviour change to happen when the interconnec-
tion reaches 12GW.
In the next paragraphs, we give results from the following assumptions:
• no correlation between fuels nor demands
• two different values for the demand’s variance: low level (0.5) and high
level (5)
• two different values for the fuel prices’ volatility : low level (1%) and high
level (10%)
In the low fuel volatility case, the merit order has only 18% probability to
change, that is the probability to observe switches between technologies is low.
The increase of interconnection capacity will therefore decrease the occurrence
of requiring the most expensive production assets (SA,2) to satisfy the global
demand. Next results are mostly explained by this fact and also by the distance,
in average, between the demand levels and the discontinuity points of the offer
curves.
Market A Market B
Figure 2: Average production costs of the two markets against mean demand
level for market A (left) and market B (right), with βA = βB = −0.01, αA =
0.56 and αB = 0.89
4.2 Forward pricing
In this subsection, we analyse the impact of the interconnection capacity E¯ =
−
¯
E on the forward prices (figure 3) and on the coupling rate (figure 4), that is,
the percentage of time during which the two spot prices are strictly equal.
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As expected, the coupling rate increases with the interconnection capac-
ity. A 100% coupling rate corresponds to when the interconnection capacity is
high enough so that the two markets are one. In parallel, the forward prices
converge to an identical value for the two markets. In every case, due to the
supposed mean levels of demands and capacities, the forward prices converge
to a price that is mainly related to the fuel cost SB,2. However, behaviours of
the forward prices and the coupling rate against the interconnection capacity E
drastically change with the assumptions of the demands’ variance and the fuel
costs’ volatility.
When both the demand variance and fuel cost volatilities are low, we re-
trieve the same results as for the coupling rate, the quasi perfect forward price
convergence appears for a value of the interconnection capacity that is higher
than 2GW due to the (even) small uncertainty on demands and fuel costs.
low fuel cost volatility, low demand variance low fuel cost volatility, high demand variance
high fuel cost volatility, low demand variance high fuel cost volatility, high demand variance
Figure 3: Forward prices of the two markets against interconnection capacities
in four cases: low (left) and high (right) variances in demand, low (top) and
high (bottom) volatilities in fuel prices.
When the demands’ variance increases, we observe a slower convergence in
the forward prices, which is trivially explained by an increasing probability that
the spread between prices PA and PB is high, and then an increasing probabil-
ity of the events A1 and A2. In these cases one needs a higher interconnection
capacity to ensure the price convergence.
We can also observe different behaviors in the forward prices with respect to
the demand variances, especially the forward price in Market A for low inter-
connection capacities:
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low fuel cost volatility, low demand variance low fuel cost volatility, high demand variance
high fuel cost volatility, low demand variance high fuel cost volatility, high demand variance
Figure 4: Coupling rate of the two markets against interconnection capacities
in four cases: low (left) and high (right) variances in demand, low (top) and
high (bottom) volatilities in fuel prices.
• When there is no interconnection, the forward price in Market A is lower
for high demand variances. This price is explained by the fact that a high
demand variance increases the probability of SA,1T being marginal, whereas
for the low demand variance, the probability of SA,2 being marginal is close
to one. Due to the discontinuity in the offer curve, this probability leads
to a lower forward price.
• When the interconnection increases, the probability of SA,1 being marginal
decreases due to the fact that it has a high probability of being the cheapest
fuel (it has a high probability of being completely used to satisfy the global
demand), and then the forward price in Market A increases.
• When the interconnection capacity is high enough, the forward price in
Market A decreases because the probability of SA,2 being marginal de-
creases (it is replaced by the available cheaper fuel in Market B).
Concerning the behaviour changes with respect to the fuel cost volatility, we
have two main observations.
• The price convergence is weaker when the fuel cost volatility is high. This
effect is due to the log-normality of the fuel costs, which decreases the
mean value when the volatility increases. This is then an artificial effect
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due to the simple example shown in this section.
• The results show a "crossing effect" which makes the forward price in
Market A lower than in Market B for middle values of interconnection
capacities. This effect highlights the impact of fuel cost volatility in the
forward prices.
When the fuel cost volatilities are low, there is a weak probability of
switches in the global merit order. In this example the two most probable
events are: i) the fuel SA,2T is the most expensive fuel and ii) the fuel
SB,2T is the most expensive fuel. Due to the average levels of demand,
when the interconnection capacity is in middle values, it is high enough
to substitute SA,2T with the cheaper fuels in Market B when S
A,2
T is the
most expensive fuel. At the same time, the interconnection capacity is not
high enough to replace SB,2 with cheaper fuels in Market A when SB,2
is the most expensive fuel. Therefore, in the two most probable events,
the price in Market A is lower or equal to the one in Market B. When the
interconnection is high enough (higher than 14GW or 15GW for low or
high variance in demand, respectively), the most expensive fuel (SA,2 or
SB,2) is always replaced by cheaper fuels.
4.3 Transmission rights pricing
In this section we are interested in the pricing of options for transmission rights
with respect to the interconnection capacity and with respect to level of un-
certainty for the demand and fuel costs. Specifically, we represent the option
prices of payoff (P¯B(VT )− P¯A(VT ))+ + (P¯A(VT )− P¯B(VT ))+ by allowing the
owner to use the interconnection in both directions. Figure 5 shows the trans-
mission right prices with respect to the transmission capacity E for any cases
of demand variance and fuel cost volatilities. The prices are obtained by using
the same parameter values as in the previous section. We can also observe that
the behaviour of the transmission right’s price is similar to the coupling rate’s
behaviour (figure 4). This similarity is logical due to the link between the option
value and the probability of convergence in the power spot prices, which leads
to a zero option value when the interconnection capacity is high enough. Thus,
the power spot prices are almost surely identical in both markets.
In addition, we compare these prices to the approximated option prices by
using the Margrabe formula. Figure 5 presents the results of the structural
model’s option prices (plain lines) compared to the Margrabe formula’s results
(dotted lines). In order to get the Margrabe’s option prices, we estimate the
spot price volatilities and correlations (needed in the Margrabe formula) on spot
prices simulated by the proposed model. In doing so, the differences in trans-
mission right prices between the two models are only linked to the valuation
formula and not to volatility or a poor evaluation of the correlation.
As a global remark, we can observe, as in [Mahringer et al., ], that the Mar-
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grabe formula leads to an overestimation of the transmission right prices. The
observed difference can be very high: for many sets of parameters and capacity
values, the Margrabe approximation can give prices that are twice the prices
given by the structural coupled model. Therefore, in practice to apply the
Margrabe formula to price the transmission rights can lead to a poor bet on
long-term explicit auctions for interconnection capacities. The difference be-
tween the two prices measures the error made by simplifying the coupled price
dynamics to the correlated price dynamics. Only in the case of small intercon-
nection capacities and small demand variances are the prices from the model
and Margrabe formula identical. 6 In this case, only the fuel costs are really
random. And the prices in Markets A and B are, with a high probability, given
by the fuel costs SA,2 and SB,2 which are log-normally distributed. Therefore,
the power spot prices in Markets A and B are quasi log-normally distributed
and the structural model’s price then corresponds to the Margrabe formula. But
when the demands’ variance is high, the power spot prices are not log-normally
distributed for the structural model and the price difference then appears even
with no interconnection.
The fact that the Margrabe formula gives higher prices compared to the pro-
posed model can be explained by the fact that the Margrabe approach neglects
the coupling mechanism. Indeed, with the market coupling mechanism, the
prices’ equality occurs with a high probability that lowers the value of the inter-
connection transmission rights compare to the same markets with no coupling
mechanism. To illustrate this effect, figure 6 presents an example of spot prices
in Markets A and B for the structural coupled model (blue dots) and for the
approximated log-normal distribution (used in the Margrabe approximation) in
red dots. This figure shows that our coupled model puts a high probability of
occurrence on identical prices in both markets (i.e., high concentration of sim-
ulations on the main diagonal), which is not the case in the log-normal model
when E > 0.
5 Conclusion
To cope with the large development of coupling in European electricity markets,
we propose in this paper a model which represents two interconnected power
markets. This model is important when a portfolio is exposed to the spread
between two neighbouring countries or to participation in long-term auctions
to get explicit interconnection capacities. To benefit from higher liquidity in
neighbouring markets is also a motivation to the portfolio manager to put in
place proxy-hedging strategies. And in order to efficiently set up these strate-
gies, the coupling mechanism between markets needs to be represented.
6The case of no interconnection seems contradictory to a positive value of the transmission
rights option. But the pricing formulas give prices in e/MWh and implicitly suppose that the
owner can always arbitrate between the two markets.
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low fuel cost volatility, low demand variance low fuel cost volatility, high demand variance
high fuel cost volatility, low demand variance high fuel cost volatility, high demand variance
Figure 5: Transmission right pricing against the interconnection capacity with
analytical formulas (solid lines) and the Margrabe formula (dashed lines) in
four cases: low (left) and high (right) variances in demand, low (top) and high
(bottom) volatilities in fuel prices.
E=0 E=4
Figure 6: Log spot price P¯A against log spot price P¯B for E = 0 (left) and
E = 4 (right) simulations for the proposed structural model in blue and the
corresponding log-normal approximation in red, with high fuel cost volatility
and high demand variance
In addition, a deep transformation in the electricity production mix is hap-
pening. Renewables’ capacities are developing, and thermal plants are being
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decommissioned. These phenomena lead to changes in the characteristics of
electricity prices and make electricity price models based on a statistical ap-
proach difficult to calibrate and inefficient in representing the future charac-
teristics of prices. This is why, the price model we propose is based on the
structural approach which represents electricity as a by-product of renewables
and thermal generation that are needed to satisfy demand.
We show how to compute the power spot prices of both markets with this
model, as well as classical derivatives like forward prices, European options, and
transmission right options. The model does all with analytical formulas, which
is essential from a practitioner’s point of view. We also show an illustration of
the results obtained from the model and especially the impacts on derivative
prices for the interconnection capacity and for the levels of volatilities. This
illustration allows us to fully understand all of the effects and shows how the
proposed model is able to deal with pricing. Especially, numerical examples il-
lustrate how different the pricing of transmission rights is between the proposed
model, which explicitly considers the coupling mechanism, versus the Margrabe
approach.
Our future work will focus on the calibration of the model to observed spot
prices, for example, in the French and German markets. Further, the restriction
to only two interconnected markets does not represent all behaviour in spot
prices well but we expect to capture the most important one. Further, we
will focus on the computation of forward prices for several maturities to build
the real forward products (with a delivery period) and then compare these
reconstructed prices to the forward prices observed in the markets, as done
in [Féron and Daboussi, 2015] in the case of one market, and, eventually, proceed
to the calibration of the model for observed forward prices.
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A Proposition proofs
This section is devoted to prove the equivalences written in the Propositions 1
to 3.
A.1 Proof of Propositions 1
In this proposition we have g(Vt) =
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
t −DAt .
Assume Vt ∈ AA3,k,l. Therefore Vt ∈ Mk,l and the optimal flow Et is such
that DAt + Et is a point of discontinuity of PA. This clearly implies that Et =
g(Vt) and DBt − g(Vt) ∈ IB,lt . Because Vt ∈ A3, it follows that ¯E < g(Vt) < E¯.There are two cases depending on the sign of Et.
• if Et > 0 we are in the first case of Definition 1, i.e. PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt ) ≤
PB(SBt ,C
B
t , D
B
t ). Because Vt ∈Mk,l and by definition of Et, this implies
P1-3. Now suppose fA(SA,kt , C¯At , DAt +Et) < fB(S
B,l
t , C¯
B
t , D
B
t −Et) then
there is ε > 0 such that Et + ε < E¯ and
fA(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + Et + ε) < f
B(SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − Et − ε)
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which contradicts the definition of Et.
• if Et < 0 we are in the second case of Definition 1, i.e. PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt ) ≥
PB(SBt ,C
B
t , D
B
t ). Because Vt ∈Mk,l and by definition of Et, this implies
P1-4. Now suppose fA(SA,k−1t , C¯At , DAt + Et) > fB(S
B,l
t , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − Et)
then there is ε > 0 such that Et − ε >
¯
E and
fA(SA,k−1t , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + Et − ε) > fB(SB,lt , C¯Bt , DBt − Et + ε)
wich contradicts the definition of Et.
Now assume that Vt respects the inequalities P1-1 to P1-4 of proposition
1. Note that if Et = g(Vt) then we directly have Vt ∈ AA3,k,l. Therefore we
only have to prove that Et = g(Vt). By definition of g(Vt) and from P1-2 we
conclude that
PA(SAt ,C
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt)) = f
A(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt))
PB(SBt ,C
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt)) = fB(SB,lt , C¯Bt , DBt − g(Vt))
• if g(Vt) > 0 then PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt ) ≤ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt ) beacause fA and
fB are increasing functions. From P1-3 we get that ∀e < g(Vt), PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt +
e) ≤ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt − e), therefore Et ≥ g(Vt) by definition of Et. And
from P1-4 we have Et ≤ g(Vt) which ends the fact that Et = g(Vt).
• if g(Vt) < 0 then PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt ) ≥ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt ) beacause fA and
fB are increasing functions. From P1-4 we get that ∀e > g(Vt), PA(SAt ,CAt , DAt +
e) ≥ PB(SBt ,CBt , DBt − e), therefore Et ≤ g(Vt) by definition of Et. And
from P1-3 we have Et ≥ g(Vt) which ends the fact that Et = g(Vt)
It is trivial to show that if Vt ∈ AA3,k,l the most expensive fuel needed to
satisfy the global demand is SB,lt and, because g(Vt) is not so thatDBt −g(Vt) is a
point of discontinuity of PB , the common price is fA,B(Vt) = fB(S
B,l
t , C¯
B
t , D
B
t −
g(Vt)).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
The proof of Proposition 2 is identical to the proof of Proposition 1. One only
needs to invert market A and market B, and change the sign of Et.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3
In this proposition we have set g(Vt) =
lnSA,kt −lnSB,lt +αA−αB+βA(C¯At −DAt )−βB(C¯Bt −DBt )
βA+βB
.
Assume Vt ∈ AC3,k,l. Because Vt ∈Mk,l we have:
PA(SAt ,C
A
t , D
A
t + Et) = f
A(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + Et)
PB(SBt ,C
B
t , D
B
t − Et) = fB(SB,lt , C¯Bt , DBt − Et)
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Because Et is such that DAt +Et and DBt −Et are not discontinuity points of PA
and PB respectively, the optimal flow Et must be such that fA(S
A,k
t , C¯
A
t , D
A
t +
Et) = f
B(SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t −Et). Therefore Et = g(Vt) and then Vt respects P3-1
to P3-3.
Now suppose that Vt respects P3-1 to P3-3. Then g(Vt) is, by its definition,
such that:
fA(SA,kt , C¯
A
t , D
A
t + g(Vt) = f
B(SB,lt , C¯
B
t , D
B
t − g(Vt))
and then Et = g(Vt) is the optimal commercial flow. From P3-1, P3-2 and P3-3
we conclude that Vt ∈ A3,k,l and the strict inequalities in assumptions P3 − 2
and P3− 3 ensures that DAt + Et and DBt − Et are not discontinuity points of
PA and PB respectively.
B Forward prices computation
This appendix is dedicated to detail the computation of forward prices, es-
pecially each term of expressions (14) and (15). In the following, for sake
of simpler notation, we consider the specific permutation, noted pi1, where
S1T ≤ S2T ≤ . . . SNT . The key tool to the computation of all the expectations of
equations (14) and (15) is Lemma 1 that allows to compute them by calculating
a probability measure, under a multivariate Gaussian probability, of a subspace
defined by linear inequalities.
Lemma 1. Let X ∼ N (µ,Σ) be a n-Gaussian vector of mean µ and covariance
Σ. For λ ∈ Rn and f a Borel measurable function, we have:
E
[
eλ
TXf(X)
]
= e
λTΣλ
2 +λ
Tµ E
(
f(X˜)
)
with X˜ ∼ N (µ+ Σλ; Σ).
B.1 Gaussian law of VT |Vt
Due to assumptions in section 2.4, The law of VT conditional to Vt is Gaussian
with mean µ(t, T ) = [µ1, µ2, . . . , µN+2]
T and covarianceΣ(t, T ) = (Σi,j)i,j=1,...,N+2
defined by:
µn = logS
n
t e
−an(T−t) +mn(t)
(
1− e−an(T−t)
)
, n = 1, . . . , N
µN+1 = f
A
T +D
A
t e
−aA(T−t)
µN+2 = f
B
T +D
B
t e
−aB(T−t)
Σi,j = ρi,jσiσj
1− e−(ai+aj)(T−t)
ai + aj
, i, j = 1, . . . , N + 2
with notations aN+1 = aA, aN+2 = aB , σN+1 = σA and σN+2 = σB .
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B.2 The case A1,k,l
We are first interested in the first term of expression (14). Using Lemma 1 we
have:
EA1,k,l = E
Q
t
[
fA(SA,kT , C¯
A
T , D
A
T + E¯)1A1,k,l(VT )1Spi1 (VT )
]
= EQt
[
eλ
TVT+η1A1,k,l(VT )1Spi1 (VT )
]
= e
λTΣ(T−t)λ
2 +λ
Tµ(T−t)+η Q
(
V˜T ∈ A1,k,l ∩ Spi1 |Vt
)
with
λ =
 EAk−βA
0
 , η = αA + βA(C¯AT − E¯)
where EAk is the N -dimensional canonical vector with a unit value at the coor-
dinate corresponding to the production cost SA,k,
and V˜T |Vt ∼ N (µ(T − t) +Σ(T − t)λ ; Σ(T − t)).
Using the definition ofMk,l in (7), we get:
A1,k,l ∩ Spi1 = A1 ∩ Spi1 ∩
{
ω ∈ Ω : DAt + E¯ ∈ IA,kt ; DBt − E¯ ∈ IB,lt
}
Therefore, the computation of EA1,k,l needs the computation of the multi-
dimensional cumulative distribution related to these inequalities:
I-1 :
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T ≤ DAT + E¯ <
∑k
i=0 C
A,i
T
I-2 :
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T ≤ DBT − E¯ <
∑l
i=0 C
B,i
T
I-3 : logSA,kT + α
A + βA(C¯AT −DAT − E¯) < logSB,lT + αB + βB(C¯BT −DBT + E¯)
I-4 : S1T ≤ S2T ≤ · · · ≤ SNT
More precisely, one needs to compute Q(a ≤MV˜T ≤ b|Vt) with:
a =

∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T − E¯∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T + E¯
−∞
0
...
0

, b =

∑k
i=0 C
A,i
T − E¯∑l
i=0 C
B,i
T + E¯
αB − αA + βB(C¯BT + E¯)− βA(C¯AT − E¯)
+∞
...
+∞

MT =
0 0 EAk − EBl D1 0 −βA 0
0 1 βB 0

In these expression, the first three elements of a and b and the first three
columns of MT (with the notation 0 for a vector of dimension N composed
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of zeros) are related to inequalities I-1 to I-3. The N − 1 last elements of a
and b and the last block of MT are related to inequalities I-4, where D is the
(N − 1)× (N − 1) differentiating matrix:
D =

−1 0 . . . . . . 0
1 −1 0 . . . 0
0 1
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . . . . 0
...
. . . . . . −1
0 . . . . . . 0 1

The computation ofEQt
[
fB(SB,lT , C¯
B
T , D
B
T − E¯)1A1,k,l(VT )1Spi1 (VT )
]
is done
using the same tools, replacing λ and η by:
λ′ =
 EBl0
−βB
 , η′ = αB + βB(C¯BT + E¯)
where EBl is the N -dimensional canonical vector with a unit value at the coor-
dinate corresponding to the production cost SB,l,
and V˜T |Vt ∼ N (µ(T − t) +Σ(T − t)λ′ ; Σ(T − t)), the latter implying that
the same event (described by a, b and C) must be measured, but under a
different Gaussian law.
B.3 The case A2,k,l
By using the same arguments of the previous section, the computation of terms
E
Q
t
[
fA(SA,kT , C¯
A
T , D
A
T + ¯
E)1A2,k,l(VT )1Spi1 (VT )
]
and
E
Q
t
[
fB(SB,lT , C¯
B
T , D
B
T − ¯E)1A2,k,l(VT )1Spi1 (VT )
]
can be done by the change of
probability related to the same λ and λ′ of section B.2, and:
η = αA + βA(C¯AT − ¯E), η
′ = αB + βB(C¯BT + ¯
E),
and the computation, under these probabilities, of the event a ≤ MV˜T ≤ b
with the same matrix M as in the section B.2 and:
a =

∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T − ¯E∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T + ¯
E
αB − αA + βB(C¯BT + ¯E)− β
A(C¯AT − ¯E)
0
...
0

, b =

∑k
i=0 C
A,i
T − ¯E∑l
i=0 C
B,i
T + ¯
E
+∞
+∞
...
+∞

26
B.4 The case A3,k,l
In this section the objective is to detail the computation in the case where spot
prices have converged in the two markets. We must then decompose the event
A3,k,l in 3 events as described in section 2.1.
B.4.1 The case AA3,k,l
In this case, the change of probability is defined with:
λ =
 EBl−βB
−βB
 , η = αB + βB (C¯BT + k−1∑
i=0
CA,iT
)
and the event a ≤MV˜T ≤ b defined by:
a =

∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T − E¯∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T +
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T
−∞
αB − αA + βB(C¯BT +
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T )− βA(C¯AT −
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T )
0
...
0

b =

∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T − ¯E∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T +
∑l
i=0 C
B,i
T
αB − αA + βB(C¯BT +
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T )− βA(C¯AT −
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T )
+∞
...
+∞

MT =
0 0 EAk−1 − EBl EAk − EBl D1 1 βB βB 0
0 1 βB βB 0

B.4.2 The case AB3,k,l
The case AB3,k,l is the same as AA3,k,l where one needs to invert market A and
market B. It gives:
λ =
 EAk−βA
−βA
 , η = αA + βA(C¯AT + l−1∑
i=0
CB,iT
)
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and the event a ≤MV˜T ≤ b defined by:
a =

∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T + ¯
E∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T +
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T
−∞
αA − αB + βA(C¯AT +
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T )− βB(C¯BT −
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T )
0
...
0

b =

∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T + E¯∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T +
∑k
i=0 C
A,i
T
αA − αB + βA(C¯AT +
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T )− βB(C¯BT −
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T )
+∞
...
+∞

MT =
0 0 EBl−1 − EAk EBl − EAk D0 1 βA βA 0
1 1 βA βA 0

B.4.3 The case AC3,k,l
In this case, the change of probability is defined with:
λ =

βB
βA+βB
EAk +
βA
βA+βB
EBl )
− βB
βA+βB
− βA
βA+βB

η =
1
βA + βB
(
βBαA + βAαB + βAβB(C¯AT + C¯
B
T )
)
and the event a ≤MV˜T ≤ b defined by:
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a =

(βA + βB)
¯
E −K
(βA + βB)
∑k−1
i=0 C
A,i
T −K
(βA + βB)
∑l−1
i=0 C
B,i
T +K
0
...
0

b =

(βA + βB)E¯ −K
(βA + βB)
∑k
i=0 C
A,i
T −K
(βA + βB)
∑l
i=0 C
B,i
T +K
+∞
...
+∞

MT =
EAk − EBl EAk − EBl EBl − EAk D−βA βB βA 0
βB βB βA 0

with K = αA − αB + βAC¯AT − βBC¯BT .
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